<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:bx="http://bx.businessweek.com">
<title>Collateralized Debt Obligations - Business Exchange</title>
<subtitle>Most Active Articles</subtitle>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/most-active/feed" rel="self"/>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations"/>
<updated>2013-06-20T02:29:51.898-04:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Business Exchange</name>
<email>Business_Exchange@businessweek.com</email>
</author>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:topic:most-active:collateralized-debt-obligations</id>
<bx:suggester>
<bx:fullname>Courtney Tabellione</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>ctabellione575</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/courtney-tabellione/ctabellione575/"/>
</bx:suggester>
<entry>
<title>Dmitrij Harder on CDO Basics</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/dmitrij-harder-on-cdo-basics/8334728481666993257-db36fafa193ae0592250a562b17b2585/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:8334728481666993257-db36fafa193ae0592250a562b17b2585</id>
<updated>2013-02-01T11:32:53.677-05:00</updated>
<summary>Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s) are a type of structured financing in which loans are funded based on the cash flow generated by specified company</summary>
<content type="html">Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s) are a type of structured financing in which loans are funded based on the cash flow generated by specified company</content>
<source>
<title>dmitrijharder.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.dmitrijharder.com/dmitrij-harder-on-cdo-basics/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Dmitrij Harder</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dharder574</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/dmitrij-harder/dharder574/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>29</bx:total>
<bx:view>29</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update: The Margin Debt Ticking Time Bomb</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/update-the-margin-debt-ticking-time-bomb/18277031349439206723-81b16ebc9f4efd23fbab5e59e66414cb/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:18277031349439206723-81b16ebc9f4efd23fbab5e59e66414cb</id>
<updated>2012-03-29T21:49:07.941-04:00</updated>
<summary>We have written many articles in the past about market movements from both the technical and the fundamentalperspective.  Lately there has been a raft of</summary>
<content type="html">We have written many articles in the past about market movements from both the technical and the fundamentalperspective.  Lately there has been a raft of</content>
<source>
<title>elliottwavemarketservice.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.elliottwavemarketservice.com/2012/03/update-the-margin-debt-ticking-time-bomb/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Paul Thomason</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>pthomason223</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/paul-thomason/pthomason223/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>6</bx:total>
<bx:view>6</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Finding Out About Merrill Lynch’s CDO Problem Was Like Getting...</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/finding-out-about-merrill-lynchs-cdo-problem-was-like-getting/4166164986092879859-87ae7f076cc9d60c88fdc13458ac0efd/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:4166164986092879859-87ae7f076cc9d60c88fdc13458ac0efd</id>
<updated>2010-04-15T12:50:48.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>Look, if former Merrill Lynch CEO Stan O&#39;Neal had known that the bank he ran was liable for $45 billion in crappy collateralized debt obligations, he...</summary>
<content type="html">Look, if former Merrill Lynch CEO Stan O&#39;Neal had known that the bank he ran was liable for $45 billion in crappy collateralized debt obligations, he...</content>
<source>
<title>Daily Intelligencer - New York Magazine</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nymag/intel/~3/scp-WcTrIE0/when_merrill_lynchs_ceo_found.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>5</bx:total>
<bx:view>5</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CDOs - Collateralised Debt Obligations (384166)</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/cdos---collateralised-debt-obligations-384166/4509037399893448717-44bba682bbd1f6173a2ef11b1ce41dd0/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:4509037399893448717-44bba682bbd1f6173a2ef11b1ce41dd0</id>
<updated>2008-11-06T04:07:00.000-05:00</updated>
<summary>Banks used CDOs to reduce the amount of debt on their balance sheet. One way to think ...</summary>
<content type="html">Banks used CDOs to reduce the amount of debt on their balance sheet. One way to think ...</content>
<source>
<title>Economics Roundtable</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/economics/cdos-collateralised-debt-obligations/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>59</bx:total>
<bx:view>58</bx:view>
<bx:save>1</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Financial Crisis For Dummies: Securitization</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/the-financial-crisis-for-dummies-securitization/8937260587205063024-ba941340ee3af5d71650ef4e91a71f96/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:8937260587205063024-ba941340ee3af5d71650ef4e91a71f96</id>
<updated>2009-04-17T22:47:00.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) The way Securitization was achieved was through the creation of a product called CDOs.</summary>
<content type="html">Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) The way Securitization was achieved was through the creation of a product called CDOs.</content>
<source>
<title>Maison Fleury</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.thedelphicfuture.org/2009/04/financial-crisis-for-dummies.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>89</bx:total>
<bx:view>89</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Jerry Z. Muller: Our Epistemological Depression</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/jerry-z-muller-our-epistemological-depression/12936830550523926854-72fd25e3f8c996208ffc2a87026abee6/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:12936830550523926854-72fd25e3f8c996208ffc2a87026abee6</id>
<updated>2009-02-09T17:53:00.000-05:00</updated>
<summary>...as a result (including municipalities in Norway that invested tax revenues in American collateralized debt obligations, now worth 15 percent...</summary>
<content type="html">...as a result (including municipalities in Norway that invested tax revenues in American collateralized debt obligations, now worth 15 percent...</content>
<source>
<title>Roundup: Historians&#39; Take</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/61746.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>38</bx:total>
<bx:view>38</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>How Wing Chau Helped Neo Default in Merrill CDOs Under SEC View</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/how-wing-chau-helped-neo-default-in-merrill-cdos-under-sec-view/17875579785537905979-1a46cbdbfc6f52f8c22ecce2f69a2660/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:17875579785537905979-1a46cbdbfc6f52f8c22ecce2f69a2660</id>
<updated>2010-05-10T11:05:07.414-04:00</updated>
<summary>In early 2007, with subprime-mortgage defaults soaring, Wing F. Chau teamed with Merrill Lynch &amp;amp; Co. to create a $300 million pool of assets that shared a name with the main character in The Matrix movies who discovers reality isn’t what it seems.</summary>
<content type="html">In early 2007, with subprime-mortgage defaults soaring, Wing F. Chau teamed with Merrill Lynch &amp;amp; Co. to create a $300 million pool of assets that shared a name with the main character in The Matrix movies who discovers reality isn’t what it seems.</content>
<source>
<title>bloomberg.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&amp;sid=adplts9scZkg</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Terence Rose</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>trose855</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/terence-rose/trose855/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>9</bx:total>
<bx:view>8</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Mish&#39;s Global Economic Trend Analysis: &quot;Banking System Still Quietly Insolvent&quot;</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/mishs-global-economic-trend-analysis-banking-system-still-quietly-insolvent/559317029269624095-7ec42f5de6183c08439ea4539a88d683/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:559317029269624095-7ec42f5de6183c08439ea4539a88d683</id>
<updated>2010-04-13T12:47:22.184-04:00</updated>
<summary>&quot;regulatory changes over the past year have affected what actually gets reported as &quot;troubled.&quot; As the New York Times recently observed, &quot; A bank owed, say, $4 million on a property now worth $3 million would previously have had to classify the entire loan as troubled. Now it can do that to the $1 million difference only.&quot;</summary>
<content type="html">&quot;regulatory changes over the past year have affected what actually gets reported as &quot;troubled.&quot; As the New York Times recently observed, &quot; A bank owed, say, $4 million on a property now worth $3 million would previously have had to classify the entire loan as troubled. Now it can do that to the $1 million difference only.&quot;</content>
<source>
<title>globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/04/banking-system-still-quietly-insolvent.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>6</bx:total>
<bx:view>4</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>2</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Recession poems</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/recession-poems/5719425613872713472-6ab72be5016b98e8fe94eba9205a05ff/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:5719425613872713472-6ab72be5016b98e8fe94eba9205a05ff</id>
<updated>2009-03-11T10:00:00.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>The Sunday NY Times Week in Review section published reader poems about the economic downturn. Here is a sampling.</summary>
<content type="html">The Sunday NY Times Week in Review section published reader poems about the economic downturn. Here is a sampling.</content>
<source>
<title>Bargain Babe</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.bargainbabe.com/2009/03/11/recession-poems/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>20</bx:total>
<bx:view>20</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>America&#39;s Debt Gets Scary by Charlie Gasparino</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/americas-debt-gets-scary-by-charlie-gasparino/12788803059385419872-0e3fdbda161276e8293c175be699f8fe/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:12788803059385419872-0e3fdbda161276e8293c175be699f8fe</id>
<updated>2010-03-16T11:35:56.210-04:00</updated>
<summary>The country’s top-notch credit rating is in danger of being downgraded, Moody’s is warning—and if a ratings agency that completely failed to predict the financial crisis is sounding the alarm, we should all be afraid.</summary>
<content type="html">The country’s top-notch credit rating is in danger of being downgraded, Moody’s is warning—and if a ratings agency that completely failed to predict the financial crisis is sounding the alarm, we should all be afraid.</content>
<source>
<title>thedailybeast.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-03-16/americas-debt-gets-scary/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>14</bx:total>
<bx:view>13</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>A China-U.S. Reckoning</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/a-china-us-reckoning/9811341162663589477-e2893cea18e6f9069fd76908a0f22085/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:9811341162663589477-e2893cea18e6f9069fd76908a0f22085</id>
<updated>2010-03-19T04:48:08.095-04:00</updated>
<summary>The two powers grope for a new normal.</summary>
<content type="html">The two powers grope for a new normal.</content>
<source>
<title>Forbes.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/17/china-united-states-trade-currency-policy-opinions-contributors-nouriel-roubini-rachel-ziemba-adam-towle.html?boxes=opinionschannellighttop</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>5</bx:total>
<bx:view>3</bx:view>
<bx:save>1</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Uncorking CDOs</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/uncorking-cdos/4482291363965995554-f019e00829bd47b07362cc13f5bc0579/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:4482291363965995554-f019e00829bd47b07362cc13f5bc0579</id>
<updated>2008-10-29T14:20:00.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>I liked this explaination of how CDOs work and why they helped cause a financial crisis…...</summary>
<content type="html">I liked this explaination of how CDOs work and why they helped cause a financial crisis…...</content>
<source>
<title>Mad Money Machine</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://madmoneymachine.com/2008/10/29/uncorking-cdos/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>14</bx:total>
<bx:view>13</bx:view>
<bx:save>1</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Why GE&#39;s in trouble</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/why-ges-in-trouble/3908577045868633538-ddeae319fbe05a9cbf73454d14ecb2a7/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:3908577045868633538-ddeae319fbe05a9cbf73454d14ecb2a7</id>
<updated>2008-10-30T04:35:55.105-04:00</updated>
<summary>financial discipline. Immelt told shareholders in February, and repeated to employees recently, that GE had no exposure to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or structured investment vehicles (SIVs). It uses derivatives for hedging, which is</summary>
<content type="html">financial discipline. Immelt told shareholders in February, and repeated to employees recently, that GE had no exposure to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or structured investment vehicles (SIVs). It uses derivatives for hedging, which is</content>
<source>
<title>CNN Money</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://c.moreover.com/click/here.pl?r1638886615&amp;f=9791</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>12</bx:total>
<bx:view>12</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Commercial Real Estate: More Trouble Ahead</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/commercial-real-estate-more-trouble-ahead/168756942552355426-3f2f80de95499cd0d3ac41fcae46fc49/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:168756942552355426-3f2f80de95499cd0d3ac41fcae46fc49</id>
<updated>2010-03-01T17:49:23.024-05:00</updated>
<summary>“Between 2010 and 2014, about $1.4 trillion in commercial real estate loans will reach the end of their terms. Nearly half are at present “underwater” – that is, the borrower owes more than the underlying property is currently worth.&quot;</summary>
<content type="html">“Between 2010 and 2014, about $1.4 trillion in commercial real estate loans will reach the end of their terms. Nearly half are at present “underwater” – that is, the borrower owes more than the underlying property is currently worth.&quot;</content>
<source>
<title>cumber.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.cumber.com/commentary.aspx?file=022610.asp</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>10</bx:total>
<bx:view>9</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Wall Street Probes: Collateralized Debt Obligations</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/wall-street-probes-collateralized-debt-obligations/9807740037510435868-6c40467b26019076d5e0d9c6bf8e1f6f/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:9807740037510435868-6c40467b26019076d5e0d9c6bf8e1f6f</id>
<updated>2010-05-24T10:53:19.613-04:00</updated>
<summary>Collateralized debt obligations, once hailed as the ingenious brainchildren of a Wall Street that knew no bounds, are now at the center of a widening government probe into the nation&#39;s most prominent banks. And as the focus gradually shifts from Goldman Sachs to all of Wall Street, CDOs have become the rallying cry for those who see the need for regulators to erect walls between banks&#39; divisions</summary>
<content type="html">Collateralized debt obligations, once hailed as the ingenious brainchildren of a Wall Street that knew no bounds, are now at the center of a widening government probe into the nation&#39;s most prominent banks. And as the focus gradually shifts from Goldman Sachs to all of Wall Street, CDOs have become the rallying cry for those who see the need for regulators to erect walls between banks&#39; divisions</content>
<source>
<title>ihavenet.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.ihavenet.com/economy/Wall-Street-Probes-Financial-Reform-Collateralized-Debt-Obligations-RS.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Constantinos Mikelis</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dmikelis084</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/constantinos-mikelis/dmikelis084/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>6</bx:total>
<bx:view>6</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Half of all CDOs of ABS failed</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/half-of-all-cdos-of-abs-failed/469536003260396820-125b460a7b0f94d63659b27840feb274/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:469536003260396820-125b460a7b0f94d63659b27840feb274</id>
<updated>2009-02-10T03:17:00.000-05:00</updated>
<summary>debt obligations, which were built from bits of other asset backed securities (ABS) such as mortgage bonds, other CDOs and structured bonds, or derivatives of any of these, according to analysts at Wachovia and Morgan Stanley. So-called CDOs of ABS</summary>
<content type="html">debt obligations, which were built from bits of other asset backed securities (ABS) such as mortgage bonds, other CDOs and structured bonds, or derivatives of any of these, according to analysts at Wachovia and Morgan Stanley. So-called CDOs of ABS</content>
<source>
<title>Financial Times</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://c.moreover.com/click/here.pl?r1814134822&amp;f=9791</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>24</bx:total>
<bx:view>24</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Dubious Birth of Mortgage-Backed Securities</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/the-dubious-birth-of-mortgage-backed-securities/1953146765351044833-86ccab5cbf14860118a3d8f736aa0434/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:1953146765351044833-86ccab5cbf14860118a3d8f736aa0434</id>
<updated>2009-06-26T16:50:44.583-04:00</updated>
<summary>How Wall Street, Ronald Reagan, and Congress created a financial time bomb.</summary>
<content type="html">How Wall Street, Ronald Reagan, and Congress created a financial time bomb.</content>
<source>
<title>thebigmoney.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/history-lesson/2009/06/25/dubious-birth-mortgage-backed-securities?page=0,0</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>John Tozzi</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>jtozzi282</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/john-tozzi/jtozzi282/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>12</bx:total>
<bx:view>11</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Borrower Equity and Defaults--The Harsh Reality</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/borrower-equity-and-defaults--the-harsh-reality/14703199251377517495-20de0f30c0e5ea0a89e6d1d82b78250e/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:14703199251377517495-20de0f30c0e5ea0a89e6d1d82b78250e</id>
<updated>2010-05-05T13:34:34.659-04:00</updated>
<summary>&quot;homeowners begin to default with the same propensity as investors.”</summary>
<content type="html">&quot;homeowners begin to default with the same propensity as investors.”</content>
<source>
<title>fixedincomecolor.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.fixedincomecolor.com/articles/mortgage-mbs/541-borrower-equity-and-defaults-the-harsh-truth</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>4</bx:total>
<bx:view>3</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Dear Mr. Buffet: a book review with a little &quot;extra&quot;</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/dear-mr-buffet-a-book-review-with-a-little-extra/10655648693759012124-707f7505a353537057d681369e629d41/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:10655648693759012124-707f7505a353537057d681369e629d41</id>
<updated>2009-02-01T17:51:00.000-05:00</updated>
<summary>...areas of credit derivatives having authored such tomes as Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and...</summary>
<content type="html">...areas of credit derivatives having authored such tomes as Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and...</content>
<source>
<title>designing better futures</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://nickgogerty.typepad.com/designing_better_futures/2009/02/dear-mr-buffet-a-book-review-with-a-little-extra.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>8</bx:total>
<bx:view>8</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Private Sector Mortgage Lending</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/private-sector-mortgage-lending/14792689337288895739-70c392ed4e2fd427e2e70bddcf07e5a9/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:14792689337288895739-70c392ed4e2fd427e2e70bddcf07e5a9</id>
<updated>2010-05-23T11:55:33.178-04:00</updated>
<summary>This chart displays the annual dollar value of all Asset-Backed Securities and GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities purchased by non-government entities. The downturn starting in 2007 shows just how bad the credit crisis was for securitized loans.</summary>
<content type="html">This chart displays the annual dollar value of all Asset-Backed Securities and GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities purchased by non-government entities. The downturn starting in 2007 shows just how bad the credit crisis was for securitized loans.</content>
<source>
<title>thumbcharts.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.thumbcharts.com/1313/private-sector-mortgage-lending</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>J. Swenson</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>jschmertz658</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/j-swenson/jschmertz658/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>2</bx:total>
<bx:view>2</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Robert Kugel on Making Mortgage Backed Securities Transparent</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/robert-kugel-on-making-mortgage-backed-securities-transparent/17079167928322601138-56cd1267d4d27d9588c4e473441b5faa/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:17079167928322601138-56cd1267d4d27d9588c4e473441b5faa</id>
<updated>2009-03-25T13:31:59.441-04:00</updated>
<summary>The United States has embarked on its public/private attempt to clear the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). A lack of transparency into the underlying assets has made it hard to accurately value these securities, delaying a recovery in the financial markets.</summary>
<content type="html">The United States has embarked on its public/private attempt to clear the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). A lack of transparency into the underlying assets has made it hard to accurately value these securities, delaying a recovery in the financial markets.</content>
<source>
<title>ventanaresearch.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.ventanaresearch.com/blog/commentblog.aspx?id=3048</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Robert Kugel</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>rkugel549</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/robert-kugel/rkugel549/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>5</bx:total>
<bx:view>5</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Financial Three Stooges: Rubin, Summers &amp; Geithner</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/the-financial-three-stooges-rubin-summers--geithner/16816302051322486267-4ad12d5feb06ed9961e801bd6b44c0bd/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:16816302051322486267-4ad12d5feb06ed9961e801bd6b44c0bd</id>
<updated>2009-03-31T10:50:00.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>Banks could then gamble with credit-default swaps and collateralized-debt obligations  financial instruments that ordinary folks and even...</summary>
<content type="html">Banks could then gamble with credit-default swaps and collateralized-debt obligations  financial instruments that ordinary folks and even...</content>
<source>
<title>politics &amp;laquo; WordPress.com Tag Feed</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://loshooter.wordpress.com/2009/03/31/the-financial-three-stooges-rubin-summers-geithner/</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>10</bx:total>
<bx:view>10</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Out of Hibernation? - Up and Down Wall Street - A. Abelson</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/out-of-hibernation---up-and-down-wall-street---a-abelson/5530797576282732723-b37e21061812fba2f82cf67103b645f6/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:5530797576282732723-b37e21061812fba2f82cf67103b645f6</id>
<updated>2010-02-11T14:06:42.296-05:00</updated>
<summary>DON&#39;T ASK, DON&#39;T TELL. Whatever its merits or lack of them in terms of Pentagon policy, for purely humanitarian reasons, we earnestly wish we could invoke that controversial concept right now, at this very moment. For what with coping with winter...</summary>
<content type="html">DON&#39;T ASK, DON&#39;T TELL. Whatever its merits or lack of them in terms of Pentagon policy, for purely humanitarian reasons, we earnestly wish we could invoke that controversial concept right now, at this very moment. For what with coping with winter...</content>
<source>
<title>online.barrons.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://online.barrons.com/article/SB126541392867041567.html</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>Terence Rose</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>trose855</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/terence-rose/trose855/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>2</bx:total>
<bx:view>2</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Service- Look Up Mbs Cusip Numbers by Trusts</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/service--look-up-mbs-cusip-numbers-by-trusts/10907228317133355497-43d3d467df76ed4e19b56207a05c79fa/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:10907228317133355497-43d3d467df76ed4e19b56207a05c79fa</id>
<updated>2010-04-16T01:21:00.000-04:00</updated>
<summary>This publication contains directories relating to real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).</summary>
<content type="html">This publication contains directories relating to real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).</content>
<source>
<title>Scribd Feed</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://www.scribd.com/doc/30009219/Service-Look-Up-Mbs-Cusip-Numbers-by-Trusts</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname></bx:fullname>
<bx:id></bx:id>
<bx:link href=""/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>13</bx:total>
<bx:view>13</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>0</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Paperwork Woes Plague Mortgage Plan</title>
<link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/collateralized-debt-obligations/paperwork-woes-plague-mortgage-plan/2620277392892853154-ab1978f07baddc4d4b95ceb3ddd56d96/"/>
<id>urn:com:businessweek:bx:article:2620277392892853154-ab1978f07baddc4d4b95ceb3ddd56d96</id>
<updated>2010-01-16T13:41:39.768-05:00</updated>
<summary>Thousands of homeowners participating in the Obama administration&#39;s foreclosure-prevention plan could miss a government deadline for completing necessary paperwork, putting them at risk of disqualification. The program, a cornerstone of President...</summary>
<content type="html">Thousands of homeowners participating in the Obama administration&#39;s foreclosure-prevention plan could miss a government deadline for completing necessary paperwork, putting them at risk of disqualification. The program, a cornerstone of President...</content>
<source>
<title>online.wsj.com</title>
</source>
<bx:external-link>http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703657604575005112496393670.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_news</bx:external-link>
<bx:adder>
<bx:fullname>David Sussman</bx:fullname>
<bx:id>dsussman850</bx:id>
<bx:link href="http://bx.businessweek.com/profile/david-sussman/dsussman850/"/>
</bx:adder>
<bx:action>
<bx:total>3</bx:total>
<bx:view>2</bx:view>
<bx:save>0</bx:save>
<bx:reaction>1</bx:reaction>
</bx:action>
</entry>
</feed>